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Ryan Gingeras 
Between the Cracks: Macedonia and the ‘Mental 
Map’ of Europe 
ABSTRACT: As arguably the most peripheral region within the Balkans, itself the most 
peripheral subset of Europe, Macedonia at the turn of the century was represented as the 
crossroads of East and West. The perceived schizophrenia of Macedonia crystallized 
during the Illinden Uprising of 1903, a rebellion that brought the provinces of Ottoman 
Macedonia to the attention of the European press. The seeming brutality of the violence, 
and the diplomatic questions related to the future administration of Macedonia, produced 
conflicting interpretations among journalists as to the ‘allegiance’ of the region. The 
discourse over the rebellious provinces in the Ottoman Empire involved two parallel lines 
of thinking, one placing it within the periphery of Europe, the other at the core of “Near 
Eastern” politics. This article explores the approach of the British press towards the 
perceived ambiguities of Ottoman Macedonia and sheds greater light upon the imagining 
of the geographic dimensions of contemporary Europe and the Middle East. 
The contemporary narrative of the classroom situates the Balkans on the 
periphery of European history. As either a site of imperial expansion or 
nationalist revolutions, the Balkans is a sideshow to the evolution of the Great 
Powers of Europe. It is only in the classical period—representing a time and 
‘civilization’ alien to the present—that the Balkans take centre stage. As a 
microcosm, Macedonia is the embodiment of this problematic shift in historical 
and geographical attention. The name Macedonia is deeply embedded in the 
European classical narrative, representing the birthplace of Alexander and the 
heart of the Ptolemaic world. Yet after the Ottoman conquest in the fourteenth 
and fifteenth centuries, the relevance of Macedonia within European history 
fades. A similar ambivalence towards the Balkans can be seen in relation to 
Middle Eastern historiography. Despite the centrality of the southern Balkans, 
and Macedonia in particular, within the history of the Ottoman Empire, most 
surveys of Middle Eastern history exclude discussion of southeastern Europe. 
Seemingly, Macedonia, as well as other regions within the Balkans, simply falls 
between the cracks. 
Macedonia’s evolution from prominence to obscurity is a by-product of the 
nineteenth century rethinking of historical, cultural and geographic boundaries 
on the southeastern periphery of the ‘Great Power’ states of Western Europe. 
While nineteenth century scholars attempted to recast classical Greece as a 
purely “European” civilization, devoid of any connection with North Africa or 
the Levant, the history of neighbouring Macedonia was simultaneously located 
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as a disputed territory between East and West.1 According to the principle actors 
who revised the notion of Macedonia, primarily journalists, scholars, travellers, 
and diplomats, the region could not be reduced to conform to one manner of 
“civilization” over another. Like the dish that would take its name, the 
macedoine comprised a jumble of parts that made it unclassifiable. 
Understanding the construction of the ‘mental map’ of Macedonia provides 
an essential insight into the modern (re-)imagining of the geographic dimensions 
of contemporary Europe and the Middle East. As arguably the most peripheral 
region within the Balkans, itself the most peripheral subset of Europe, 
Macedonia at the turn of the century was represented as the crossroads of East 
and West. The perceived schizophrenia of Macedonia crystallized during the 
Ilinden Uprising of 1903, a rebellion that brought the provinces of Ottoman 
Macedonia to the attention of the European press. The seeming savagery of the 
uprising, and the diplomatic questions related to the future administration of 
Macedonia produced conflicting interpretations among journalists as to the 
“allegiance” of the region. While the nature of the violence enacted during the 
Ilinden Uprising fixed Macedonia within the Balkans, strategic, and to a degree, 
cultural associations suggested that the crisis must be managed within the 
broader scope of the “Near East.” In other words, the discourse over Macedonia 
at the turn of the century involved two parallel lines of thinking, one placing it 
within the periphery of Europe, the other at the core of “Near Eastern” politics. 
The debate over Macedonia’s relationship with Europe at the turn of the 
century resonates strongly with contemporary issues of identity and space on the 
continent. As with the present dialogue over Turkey’s entrance into the 
European Union, press coverage of Macedonia at the turn of the twentieth 
century presents a reckoning over the meaning of Europe as a geographic and 
cultural entity. 
 
FROM PROMINENCE TO OBSCURITY: MACEDONIA, HISTORIOGRAPHY AND THE 
ORIGINS OF THE ‘MENTAL MAP’ OF EUROPE 
To understand the notion of Macedonia as both a place on the map as well as a 
member of a system of culturally related “nations,” one must first look critically 
at the historical conception of Europe. Macedonia was among the first lands to 
be included in the idea of Europe during the early Hellenic period, 
geographically distinct from Asia (a region dominated by Persian hegemony), 
and Africa (lands closely identified with Libya).2 Initially defined as a purely 
geographic entity, the concept of Europe underwent a second critical revisioning 
during the early medieval period, as Christianity spread beyond the borders of 
                                                           
1
 Martin Bernal, Black Athena: The Afroasiatic Roots of Classical Civilization (New 
Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1987).  
2
 Denys Hays, Europe: The Emergence of an Idea (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University 
Press, 1968) 2. 
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the former Roman Empire. 3  Although associated with Eastern Orthodoxy, 
Macedonia remained an integral part of medieval Christendom. It is interesting 
to note that medieval Russia, also an Eastern Orthodox land, was excluded from 
the formulation of a European consciousness due to its physical isolation.4 It is 
only during the late Renaissance that a more contemporary conception of 
Europe begins to emerge. The concept of Renaissance Europe paired both the 
geographic and cultural notions of Europe and Christendom, yet underscored the 
centrality of secularly governed nation-states as the core of its collective identity. 
While fifteenth and sixteenth century thinkers refashioned the medieval 
notion of Europe, Macedonia found itself on the outside of the cultural and 
political conditions of the Renaissance. In the centuries preceding the Ottoman 
conquest, Macedonia was the site of the shifting imperial fortunes of the 
Bulgarian, Serbian and Byzantine Empires. With the solidification of Ottoman 
rule in the Balkans during the course of the fifteenth century, European scholars 
ceased to identify Macedonia with the emerging state system. Macedonia would 
remain thoroughly integrated into the Ottoman administrative structure until the 
region’s annexation by Bulgaria, Serbia and Greece after the Balkan Wars in 
1912.  
How post-Enlightenment Europe conceived of Macedonia and the other 
lands of southeastern Europe has been a matter of some debate among historians 
over the last several years. Larry Wolff has argued that Enlightenment-era 
travellers and scholars invented an ‘Eastern Europe’ to provide a photo negative 
of the cultural and social changes occurring in Paris and London.5 Yet, his work 
only partially ventures into Western perceptions of Ottoman Rumeli (or the land 
of the Romans), which, according to Wolff, seemed almost a separate category 
of geography within the confines of Eastern Europe.  
Edward Said’s classic work Orientalism has provided some foundation for 
several studies on the historical construction of space and society in the Balkans. 
In an analysis of Western studies of Islam and of the Middle East, Said asserts 
that a philosophy and discourse of superiority developed among European 
scholars during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. This notion of 
superiority was drawn in direct comparison with the “images, idea, personality 
and experience” of the Muslim “Orient.”6 The Orient is naturally not an “inert 
fact of nature.” Rather, discourse over the meaning and contours of the Orient 
                                                           
3
 Martin W. Lewis and Kären E. Wigen, The Myth of Continents: A Critique of 
Metageography (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997) 23–25. 
4
 Mark Bassin, “Russia Between Europe and Asia: The Ideological Construction of 
Geographical Space,” Slavic Review 50.1 (Spring 1991): 3–4. 
5
 Larry Wolff, Inventing Eastern Europe: The Map of Civilization in the Enlightenment 
Mind (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994). 
6
 Edward Said, Orientalism (New York: Pantheon Books, 1978) 1–2. 
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served to affirm the West’s political and economic dominance over the Muslim 
(primarily Arab) world. The actual study of the Orient in turn provided a series 
of intellectual premises used to “manage” Muslim populations and affirm the 
West’s imperial ownership of this physical space. Said’s Orientalism has 
inspired works arguing a form of European imperialism over the Balkans 
through literature and the internalization of Orientalist ideas of civilization 
within the confines of the former Yugoslavia.7  
However, Orientalism is not undisputed as the only interpretative 
framework in Balkan historiography. Maria Todorova argues that Orientalism 
does not adequately explain Western discourse over the Balkans. Rather the 
system of rhetoric and imagery used to describe the Balkans evolved 
independently and often in opposition to Orientalism. Within the Balkanism 
framework (a term coined by Todorova), the Orientalist vision of the nineteenth 
and twentieth centuries detaches the Balkans from the ‘Islamic’ or ‘Arab’ 
worlds, perceiving southeastern Europe as geographically and culturally distinct 
from the Levant. 8  As a region historically associated with Europe and 
Christianity, as well as the more modern notion of whiteness, Balkanism entails 
an internal effort to understand an ambiguity within the European identity.9 This 
contention is further fortified by the work of Katherine Fleming. Fleming 
criticizes the Orientalist approach towards the Balkans since the tradition of 
European imperialism, central to Said’s thesis, is absent in the case of 
southeastern Europe. According to Fleming, while certain rhetorical aspects of 
Orientalism are present in Balkan historiography, this theoretical framework 
alone is an unsuitable application in dealing with the region in toto.10 
While demarcating space into continents and regions is not restricted to 
geographical conditions, our analysis cannot essentialize the uniformity of an 
imagined locality. In the case of Europe, the notion of civilization is a much 
worked over concept within the craft of history.11 As Milca Bakic-Hayden 
                                                           
7
 Vesna Goldsworthy, Inventing Ruritania: The Imperialism of the Imagination (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1998); Milca Bakic-Hayden, “Nesting Orientalisms: The 
Case of Former Yugoslavia,” Slavic Review 54.4 (1995): 917–931; Milca Bakic-Hayden 
and Robert Hayden, “Orientalist Variations on the Theme ‘Balkans’: Symbolic 
Geography in Recent Yugoslav Cultural Politics,” Slavic Review 51.1 (Spring 1992): 1–
15. 
8
 Maria Todorova, “The Balkans: From Discovery to Invention,” Slavic Review 53.2 
(Summer 1994): 455.  
9
 Maria Todorova, Imagining the Balkans (Oxford: University Press, 1997) 11; Maria 
Todorova, “Der Balkan als Analyzekategorie: Grenzen, Raum, Zeit,” Geschichte und 
Gesellschaft 28 (2002): 472, 473. 
10
 Katherine E. Fleming, “Orientalism, the Balkans, and Balkan Historiography,” 
American Historical Review 105.4 (October 2000): 1224.  
11
 Paul Rich, “Civilization in European and World History: A Reappraisal of the Ideas of 
Arnold Toynbee, Fernand Braudel and Marshall Hodgson,” The European Legacy 7.3 
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points out, one may perceive various degrees of civilization even within a 
specific area.12 Characterization of geography is also dependent upon the sample 
of viewers, as seen through our often uncritical use of the term Western or 
Occidental.13 It is also clear that the criteria for how space is classified changes 
with time. In the case of the Balkans, nineteenth and early twentieth century 
British policymakers worked within the confines of “Near Eastern Affairs,” a 
newly invented term used to describe the western periphery of the Ottoman 
Empire.14 This correlation between strategic prerogatives and perceptions of 
geography persists to the present, as many students of modern Albanian, 
Lithuanian or Georgian history still find themselves under the Cold War-era 
umbrella of Russian and Eastern European studies.  
Understanding Macedonia’s place in the world is an issue little discussed in 
the realm of current research. Instead, contemporary scholars have largely 
focused upon the turn of the century debates regarding the specifically 
“national” or “cultural” content of Macedonia.15 In reconsidering the works of 
European and Ottoman cartographers, ethnographers and administrators who 
devoted themselves to understanding the complexities of Macedonia’s 
population, today’s scholars have tended to de-emphasize the larger question of 
where Macedonia was situated in relation to the borders of civilizations and 
continents. Perhaps more importantly, recent studies have tended to downplay 
the internal contradictions and disagreements among foreign observers 
concerning Macedonia’s place in the world. The specific case of Macedonia in 
1903 underscores many of the pitfalls underlying the historical understanding of 
Macedonia as a location on the map. 
The British press, the sample perspective that this essay assumes, 
articulated its perceptions of Macedonia during the Ilinden Uprising in 
accordance with certain essential biases. The editorialization of the crisis 
diverged along internal partisan lines (Tories and Liberals/Turcophiles and 
Turcophobes) of dissent and support for British foreign policy towards the 
Ottoman Empire. The press of the United Kingdom naturally represented 
                                                                                                                                    
(2002): 331–342. 
12
 Milca Bakic-Hayden 917–918. 
13
 Todorova, Imagining the Balkans 10; James Carrier, “Occidentalism: The World 
Turned Upside-down,” American Ethnologist 19.2 (May 1992): 195–212. 
14
 Roderic H. Davison, “Where is the Middle East?” Modern Middle East, edited by 
Richard Nolte (New York: Atherton Press, 1963) 16; W.B Fisher, “Unity and Diversity in 
the Middle East,” Geographical Review 37 (1947): 414–415; Lewis 66. 
15
 See for example, H.R. Wilkinson, Maps and Politics: A Review of Ethnographic 
Cartography of Macedonia (Liverpool: University of Liverpool Press, 1951); İpek 
Yosmaoğlu, “The Priest’s Robe and the Rebel’s Rifle: Communal Conflict and the 
Construction of National Identity in Ottoman Macedonia, 1878–1908,” PhD Dissertation 
(Princeton University, 2005). 
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uniquely British political prerogatives in Macedonia, often in opposition to those 
of other European powers.  
From the editorial desks of several major British newspapers, the savage 
nature of the Ilinden Uprising elicited conflicting feelings towards both the 
combatants and their victims. The tide of violence in Macedonia was perceived 
within the confines of the ‘historical oppression’ of the Ottoman regime, an 
Oriental power, towards Christian peoples on the borders of Europe. Yet 
Christian acts of brutality towards Muslims and other Christians alike blemished 
the conflict, reducing it to an almost tribalist affair. In this regard, according to 
British spectators, Macedonia encapsulated the cruel, sordid realities of the 
Balkans.  
Aspects of the Ilinden Uprising simply could not be perceived and managed 
within confines of Europe. The Macedonian provinces were integral components 
of the Ottoman Empire, devoid of a singular confessional or ethnic identity. As 
seen through the prominent role of native Muslim Albanians within the Ilinden 
Uprising, Macedonia could not be essentialized as a member of the Christian 
Balkans. British journalists and editors also contemplated the multi-confessional 
disposition of Macedonia when considering the regional and international 
implications of the crisis. Alluding to the former sectarian conflicts in Ottoman 
Lebanon and Armenia, the Ottoman state had to be included in the solution to 
the Macedonia crisis in order to avoid further inter-communal violence and the 
commencement of an inter-European war over the Near East.  
 
LIKE THE “WILDEST SCENES OF THE THIRTY YEARS WAR”: ETHNICITY, 
VIOLENCE AND THE MACEDONIAN CONTEXT 
Ottoman Macedonia was a territory in dramatic flux during the course of the 
nineteenth century. In the face of mounting debts, foreign invasion and internal 
dissent, the Ottoman state undertook a radical policy of domestic reform. In 
redefining notions of law, education, citizenship, taxation and other forms of 
civil participation, Istanbul worked feverishly to expand centralized control over 
its empire. 16  This reform scheme ultimately could not forestall separatist 
                                                           
16
 See Fikret Adanır, Die Makedonische Frage: Ihre Entstehung und Entwicklung bis 
1908 (Wiesbaden: Steiner Verlag, 1979); Fikret Adanır, “The Macedonians in the 
Ottoman Empire, 1878–1912,” in The Formation of National Elites: Volume IV, edited 
by Andreas Kappler (Dartmouth: New York University Press, 1992) 161–191; Niyazi 
Berkes, The Development of Secularism of Turkey. (Montreal: McGill University Press, 
1964); Isa Blumi, “Defying the State and Defining the State: Local Politics in 
Educational Reform in the Vilayets of Manastir and Yanya, 1878–1912,” in Rethinking 
the Late Ottoman Empire: A Comparative Social and Political History of Albania and 
Yemen, 1878-1918, edited by Isa Blumi (Istanbul: Isis Press, 2003) 103–122; Roderic 
Davison, “Turkish Attitudes Concerning Christian-Muslim Equality in the Nineteenth 
Century,” American Historical Review 59.4 (July 1954): 844–864; Ussama Makdisi, The 
Culture of Sectarianism: Community History and Violence in Nineteenth-Century 
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elements in the empire to press forward with their plans for secession. Among 
the groups determined to break free from the grip of the Ottoman state was a 
small group of revolutionaries based in the Macedonian port city of Salonika. 
Inspired by the recent successes of separatist forces in neighbouring Bulgaria 
(where many of these revolutionaries had previously worked or studied), this 
group of native-born Macedonian intellectuals set out in 1893 to secure through 
violent means an autonomous (and eventually an independent) state in the heart 
of the Ottoman Balkans. Over the next decade, these founders of the Internal 
Macedonian Revolution Organization (Vûtreshna Makedonska Revoliutsionna 
Organizatsiia or VMRO) laid the groundwork for revolt, organizing local 
peasants and expatriate radicals into armed gangs or çetes. The VMRO’s 
activities did not go uncontested. In addition to the countermeasures taken by 
Ottoman security forces, this largely Bulgarian Orthodox (or “Exarchate”) 
insurgency was forced to contend with rival ethnic paramilitary groups backed 
either by the kingdoms of Greece and Serbia or the Muslims population at large, 
who almost unanimously did not desire to separate themselves from the 
Ottoman state. The threat of arrest and internal dissent drove the VMRO to 
launch their long planned revolt prematurely in the summer of 1903, leading to 
the thousands of deaths by the time the uprising ended later that fall.17 
With the first reports of an insurrection in Macedonia on 2 August 1903, the 
theme of violence dominated the headlines of the major British newspapers 
throughout the months of the revolt. In each daily printing, journalists tallied the 
reports of various acts that would trickle in. Through the progression of events, 
the catalogue of brutality grew cantankerous with repetition. In its sum total, the 
violent events occurring in Ottoman Macedonia resembled, to one observer, “the 
wildest scenes of the Thirty Years War.”18 
While there was no shortage of stories that illustrated the barbarities 
committed in Macedonia, several names and events became caricatures of the 
crisis. Within each atrocity, the multiple actors engaged in the conflict, each 
reflecting the recognized ethnic and confessional groups comprising Macedonia, 
were typecast along the lines of conflicting civilizations.19 While journalists and 
                                                                                                                                    
Ottoman Lebanon (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000). 
17
 For concise studies of this period in Macedonia’s history, see Nadine Lange-Akhund, 
The Macedonian Question, 1893–1908: From Western Sources (Boulder, Colorado: 
Eastern European Monographs, 1998); Murat Hatipoğlu, Dünden ve Bügüne Makedonya 
Sorunu (Ankara: ASAM Yayınları, 2002); Duncan Perry, The Politics of Terror: The 
Macedonian Revolutionary Movements, 1893–1903 (Durham: Duke University Press, 
1988); Gül Tokay, Makedonya Sorunu: Jön Türk İhtilali’nin Könkenleri, 1903–1908 
(Istanbul: AFA Yayınları, 1996). 
18
 “The Macedonian Outbreak,” The London Times 14 August 1903.  
19
 The use of ethnic categories in regards to the population of Macedonia cannot be read 
uncritically. The use of census material was often employed in nineteenth century to 
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editors from the ‘Turcophobe’ Left and ‘Turcophile’ Right at times disagreed as 
to the relative virtues of the combatants, both perspectives within the British 
press affirmed the otherness of the region. Yet it is within the individual 
characterization of the supposed ethnic groups that one finds a general 
overlapping notion of Europe, the Balkans and the Near East within Macedonia. 
The most powerful example of the complexity and savagery in Macedonia 
was the battle of Krushevo in the middle of August. Initially the site of a rebel 
victory against Ottoman forces, Krushevo was later the scene of a violent 
massacre of local inhabitants by Ottoman troops as well as local militiamen.20 
The first British reports of the taking and retaking of Krushevo contained little 
in the way of detail,21 but soon reports of a more general massacre of civilians 
followed.22 By 26 August, the details that would emerge from the Krushevo 
massacre were explicit and heart wrenching, as stories of rape, pillage and 
indiscriminate killing of Christians by Ottoman soldiers abounded. For the 
supporters of the rebels, as well as for the so-called ‘Turcophiles’ in the Tory 
press, the massacre symbolized the evil spreading throughout Macedonia.23 
Thematically, Krushevo emphasized several determining biases of the British 
press in their attitude towards the phenomenon of violence. Supremely, violence 
represented a dichotomy between the “Turk” and the “Bulgarian” as polar 
declinations between East and West.  
In a conflict that distinguished combatants along ethnic lines, the 
“Unspeakable Turk” arose as the embodiment of villainy and the maladies of the 
East. Alluding as far back as to the period of Genghis Khan, British journalists 
presented Ottoman (i.e., Eastern) oppression in the Balkans as steeped in 
history.24 The massacre at Krushevo served to verify the preternatural cruelty of 
                                                                                                                                    
prove the predominance of various ethnic groups in Macedonia. In each of these 
censuses, often conducted by Western European scholars, the criteria of “religion” and 
“language” provided the basis for the ethnic categorization of the region. However, few 
of these studies considered the multi-lingual tendencies of the Macedonian population or 
understood the shifts in sectarian allegiance within Macedonian society. The fluidity of 
religion and ethnic identity persisted well in the twentieth century. See Anastasia 
Karakasidou, Fields of Wheat, Hills of Blood: Passages to Nationhood in Greek 
Macedonia, 1870–1990 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997). 
20
 In the contemporary Republic of Macedonia, Krushevo carries with it the connotation 
of Macedonia’s genesis as a political entity. See Keith Brown, The Past in Question: 
Modern Macedonia and the Uncertainties of the Nation (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2003). 
21
 “The Dispatch of the Russian Squadron,” The London Times 19 August 1903.  
22
 “A Fortnights Review: The Eastern Outbreak Predicted,” The Manchester Guardian 22 
August 1903; “Great Britain and the Porte,” The London Times 20 August 1903. 
23
 Editorial, The London Times 5 September 1903; “Turkish Outrages,” The London 
Times 26 August 1903; “The Sack of Krushevo,” The Manchester Guardian 26 August 
1903.  
24
 “Greece and Turkey,” The Daily News 31 August 1903; “Flogging a Dead Horse,” The 
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the Ottomans.25 For editors on both the Left and the Right, Ottoman bloodlust in 
Macedonia was symptomatic of the greater barbarism plaguing Ottoman state 
and society. Violent reprisals by Ottoman troops upon the Christian population 
on the scale seen in Macedonia revealed the “fanaticism” inherent within Islam. 
Although it is often not specified what the meaning of fanaticism fully purveyed, 
this term more or less implied the violent reaction against religious or cultural 
antagonisms.26 One such example that demonstrated Ottoman fanaticism was 
the murder of the Russian Consul in Manastır by an Albanian soldier in early 
August.27 This example of “Islamic extremism” was followed by reports stating 
that Muslims were gathering in mosques throughout Macedonia, which was 
interpreted as a sign of impending massacres.28 British perceptions towards 
“fanatical Muslims” in Macedonia were set against the backdrop of the Ottoman 
reform movement of the nineteenth century. Despite repeated imperial 
proclamations promoting legal equality between Muslims and Christians in the 
nineteenth century, British editors covering the Macedonia story agreed that it 
was impossible for a Muslim state to place non-Muslims “on a footing of 
equality with the Mussulman…”29 In this sense, the conflict in Macedonia took 
on a tone of a crusade for some British journalists, emphasizing the need to rid 
the incurable evil of Muslim rule over a Christian population.30  
As a military affair, it became clearer to the correspondents in the region, as 
well as their desk-bound counterparts in England, that the rebellion was initially 
progressing at the expense of Turkish feebleness. Repeated stories of desertion, 
maltreatment, confusion, and low morale among the Ottoman troops were 
highlighted in the ‘Intelligence’ sections of the news.31 One Guardian editor 
                                                                                                                                    
Daily News 2 September 1903.  
25
 Editorial, The Manchester Guardian, 10 September 1903. “Macedonia Again,” The 
Daily News 7 August 1903; Editorial, The Observer, 16 August 1903; “What Macedonia 
Wants,” The Observer 6 September 1903.  
26
 For a comparative look at the historical usage of the term “fanaticism,” see David 
Edwards, “Mad Mullahs and Englishmen: Discourse in the Colonial Encounter,” 
Comparative Studies in Society and History 31.4 (October 1989): 647–670. 
27
 “A Russian Consul Murdered,” The London Times 10 August 1903; For further detail 
see Duncan Perry, “Death of a Russian Consul: Macedonia 1903,” Russian History 6 
(1980): 120.  
28
 “Spread of Rising,” The London Times 13 August 1903; “Increasing Excitement of the 
Musselmans,” The Manchester Guardian 13 August 1903; Editorial, The Manchester 
Guardian 18 August 1903; “Will Turkey Resist,” The Daily News 19 August 1903.  
29
 “Macedonia,” The London Times 15 August 1903.  
30
 Letter to the Editor, The Daily News 4 September 1903.  
31
 “The Macedonian Outbreak,” The London Times 12 August 1903; “The Powers and the 
Situation,” The London Times 27 August 1903; Editorial The London Times 19 August 
1903; “A Russian Consul Shot,” The Observer 8 August 1903; “The Macedonian 
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surmised that the Ottomans simply did not possess the needed “science, political 
tact, high individual intelligence, machine-like organization” to put down a 
guerrilla insurgency.32 Too backward to compensate and too decrepit to reform, 
to the point that the word reform “itself stinks in Turkish nostrils,” the Ottomans 
typified the “Oriental” type: weak, reactionary, regressive, and savage.33  
While the “Turk” occupied the role of the alien, Oriental other, indigenous 
allies to the Ottoman state were painted with the same brush. In addition to the 
atrocities attributed to Ottoman regulars, local militias, or başıbozuks, were held 
equally responsible for numerous massacres during the Ilinden Uprising and 
therefore possessed many of the Oriental traits attributed to the Ottoman state.34 
British journalists emphasized the regional specificity of these units in 
identifying them as comprising locally recruited Muslim Albanians. While these 
Muslims “shared no community of race” with other Muslims of the region, 
Albanians were still recognized as “Turks” in that they shared in administering 
the Ottoman Empire.35 Henry Noel Brailsford, a correspondent working for the 
Manchester Guardian during the Ilinden Uprising, wrote: 
There is no race in European Turkey which enjoys collectively a reputation quite so 
unenviable as that of the Albanians. They are the bêtes noires of the Embassies, the 
scapegoat of the Porte… If anywhere excesses have been committed [during 
punitive operations] which even the Sultan cannot deny, the inevitable excuse is that 
                                                                                                                                    
Revolt,” The Observer 23 August 1903. 
32
 Editorial, The Manchester Guardian 27 August 1903; “Smoking Them Out,” The Daily 
News 7 September 1903. In still another report discussing the Ottoman intention of 
burning down the forests in order to keep Christian rebels on the run, one reporter had 
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have trodden. To destroy the forests in Northern and North-eastern Macedonia will be quite in 
keeping with the Turkish method of government from the day when the Sultans first crossed 
into Europe. 
33
 “The Powers and the Situation,” The London Times 27 August 1903. 
34
 “Bashi-Bazouks Raiding,” The Daily News 18 August 1903; “Turkish Outrages,” The 
London Times 26 August 1903. 
35
 H.N. Brailsford, Macedonia: Its Races and their Future (London: Methuen & Co., 
1906) 81. It has been argued that the distinction between “Turks” and “Albanians” in 
Macedonia during the Ottoman period in fact mirrors the divergence between rural and 
urban Muslims. Burcu Akan Ellis contends that rural (köylü) Muslims, regardless of their 
ethnic origins, were traditionally socialized into the Albanian culture while urban (şehirli) 
Muslims accepted Ottoman Turkish-speaking imperial culture. See Burcu Akan Ellis, 
Shadow Genealogies: Memories and Identity Among Urban Muslims in Macedonia 
(Boulder: Eastern European Monographs, 2003). 
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the Albanians ‘got out of hand…’ For a century past this ill name was the only 
herald which brought the Albanians to the knowledge of the West.36 
Despite the parody between “Turks” and “Albanians” drawn by British editors 
and reporters, the “Albanian” is never identified as an intruder or alien force in 
Macedonian affairs. Journalists instead affirm the fact that Muslim Albanian 
was a native character and indigenous manifestation of the foreign rulers. While 
playing the foil to their Christian adversaries, the Albanians portrayed in British 
coverage of the Ilinden Uprising suggested that within Macedonia there were 
internal fault lines between Christianity and Islam, and between East and West. 
In other words, it seemed that the Oriental could indeed cohabit, as well as be 
native to, Macedonia.37 
Standing opposed to the “Turk” were the Christians insurgents of the 
VMRO, occupying the role of the victims and martyrs in the Ilinden affair. 
Among the representatives of the British press, The Daily News took up the 
Ilinden Uprising with the most conviction, championing the VMRO’s success 
and pardoning their failures. For editors at the Daily News and the Guardian, the 
case of the lamentable “Bulgarian Christian,” seen as the primary components of 
the VMRO, was the embodiment of the Liberal humanitarian cause: 
Sunk in bestial poverty in the midst of great natural riches, crushed into serfdom by 
alien landlords on the soil that is its inheritance, the prey of every brigand or soldier 
or Moslem neighbour who has a knife in his belt, with neither courts nor police nor 
arms to which he can appeal in his own defense, the peasant fights, when at length 
he has the means, with no sense of sacredness of life—for what is life worth in the 
Balkans? The conquerors who have eaten his bread and stolen his labour have also 
crushed his soul and deadened his humanity.38 
As a fighting body, Liberal papers highlighted the audacity of the VMRO with 
each step.39 In most cases, journalists emphasized the humanity of the VMRO 
insurgents in comparison to their Turkish or başıbozuk adversaries.40  
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Some instances of VMRO violence were harder to explain away. In 
comparison to the more or less ubiquitously held view of the savage and 
degenerate Turk, the conservative press tended to find some reason to condemn 
the VMRO. As one reads in the earlier accounts of the Times, it is often 
construed that the VMRO themselves were the culprits of the mass of atrocities 
being committed in Ottoman Macedonia.41 Irrespective of one’s sympathies, the 
issue of VMRO atrocities could not be ignored. The most noted terrorist attack 
by the VMRO during the Ilinden Uprising occurred on 26 August at Kukeli 
Burgas in the vilâyet of Edirne.42 That evening a bomb exploded in the kitchen 
of a civilian train, killing several Muslim women and children and injuring 
several others.43 For Liberal news editors, this event challenged the seeming 
chivalry of the VMRO. Still the Daily News chose to take the news in stride and 
accentuated the greater evils of the Turk in Macedonia.44 Although the VMRO 
meant no ill will against the civilians who died in the attack, Kukeli Burgas 
demonstrated that the VMRO was only responding to the atrocities committed 
by the Turks and were targeting their property.45 Another editor of the Daily 
News reasoned that it was unfair “to blame the whole body of the insurgents for 
crimes committed by a few irreconcileables [sic] among them. The people of 
London would be indignant if foreign critics should take Jack the Ripper’s 
performances or illustrations and reports of the ‘The Police News’ as the 
measure of metropolitan morality.”46 Instead, Liberal journalists explained these 
acts of violence as expressions of desperation by men stretched “beyond the 
limits of humanity.”47  
Nonetheless, under this guise of intolerable oppression, the VMRO, for 
better or worse, stood apart from the “Turk,” bringing justice and order to 
Macedonia. Recognizing them as an organized body of men comprised mostly 
of schoolteachers, journalists alluded to the “tradition of revolt” in the Balkans 
as the necessary prelude to independence.48 It was publicized that the VMRO 
was more than just a guerrilla movement, but the beginnings of Macedonia’s 
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own provisional government.49 According to stories reported from the interior, 
the VMRO had already begun the process of collecting taxes, using force if 
necessary to receive was what required to them.50 In this regard, the VMRO 
represented the order and reason typifying the European state. Still, despite the 
seeming commonalties of religion and, arguably, race, there is a clear separation 
between the English newspaper reader and the Macedonian peasant. Through 
depravation and centuries of exposure to the Turk, the Christian peasant became 
dehumanized and instinctively underdeveloped as a European. He was, at best, 
culturally, a simpleton. Under such duress, he became bestial and unable to 
distinguish any sort of value of a human life. 
This separation between the Balkan Christian and the British observer was 
especially pronounced with reports that Bulgarian Christian insurgents actively 
feuded with their local Greek Patriarchist counterparts.51 These stories often 
disclosed details of attacks against Greek villages, the extortion of wealthy 
Greek citizens and the execution of purported Greek spies by the VMRO.52 
Among the best-publicized accounts of VMRO violence against the Greek 
population of Ottoman Macedonia were the series of assaults against Greek 
villages along the Black Sea coast after the declaration of revolt in the vilâyet of 
Edirne.53 It later became known in the press that Greeks had raised their own 
çetes or gangs to combat the VMRO and refused assistance to the Exarchist or 
Bulgarian refugees of the fighting.54 Meanwhile the Greek government, as well 
as the Greek Patriarch of Istanbul, interceded on the behalf of the Greeks of 
Macedonia.55 As a conflict seemingly dominated by Muslim/Christian violence, 
this enmity between Greeks and Bulgarians did not sit well with the British 
press. How could fellow Christians turn against one another in the face of the 
greater threat of Islam? Moreover, how could Greece, which only recently had 
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been “liberated” from the “Turkish yoke,” resort to supporting the Porte against 
the insurgents?  
The answers to these questions found within the British press contain 
certain key similarities. For the Guardian, the inter-Christian violence of the 
Ilinden Uprising reflected the general problem of “racial and religious feuds” in 
Eastern Europe.56 Denouncing it as a “scandal to Europe,” the Daily News 
concurred that the violence in Macedonia was in the end a mass brawl with the 
multifarious sectarian and ethnic groups fighting one another.57 The Tory Right 
and Liberal Left agreed that the responsibility for this discord among the Balkan 
Christians rested squarely upon the Greek government. The Times warned that 
Britain’s past support for Greek independence should not blind the reader to 
Athens’ monstrous resolution of “co-operating with Turkey against fellow-
Christians in the field.”58 The Daily News posed the “treachery of Greece” in 
much stronger terms, stating: 
The jealousy between Greek and Slav is the one disquieting [aspect]… of a situation 
where otherwise the struggle between European and Asiatic civilization has been 
maintained on a fierce and brutal, but none the less on a heroic level… But the 
treachery of Greece reduces us to a much more sordid plane [sic]. Turkey has known 
well how to appeal to the weakness of the Hellenic character. She has woven the 
Greek trader and capitalist into the web of her corrupt machinery of government… 
For years they have stood in with the Turk, and they must now be prepared to take a 
share of the detestation aroused by the misdeeds and extortion of the Turk.59  
Inter-communal fighting between Exarchists and Patriarchists solidified 
Macedonia’s place within the Balkans. It is during the Ilinden Uprising, as 
Todorova argues, that European writers reinforced the idea of the Balkans as 
synonymous with violence and tribalism in the twentieth century.60 Greek and 
Bulgarian violence resulted in a coup against the civilization that seemed most 
likely to support and welcome them. Instead, the ferocity of this hatred 
threatened to reduce the proceedings in Macedonia to a more “sordid plain” (the 
Balkans), poisoning the seemingly hallowed crusade of liberation against the 
Ottoman government. 
 
EUROPE’S LEBANON: THE ILINDEN UPRISING AND ITS REGIONAL CONTEXT 
While the human element of the Ilinden Uprising occupied a prominent place 
within any discussion of Macedonia in 1903, the concerns of British journalists 
and editors over the Ottoman Balkans was not restricted to the local actors. A 
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great deal of interest was devoted to the international implications of the crisis, 
with regards to the future stability of the Ottoman Empire and relations between 
the Great Powers of Europe. It is this aspect of British press coverage of the 
Ilinden Uprising that the discussion of Macedonia takes a turn away from 
culture and society in the region, and towards the strategic significance of 
Macedonia within the Near East.  
Macedonia attracted international attention after the murder of Russian 
Consul Rostowsky in Manastır. Receiving the death of its representative with 
outrage, St. Petersburg promptly dispatched a portion of its fleet to the Thracian 
coast and demanded the murderer’s execution.61 Despite Austria-Hungary’s 
seeming approval of the demonstration, doubts in Great Britain remained.62 
Although it was understood that Russia and Austria-Hungary were the 
recognized custodians of peace in the Balkans, the Tory press was among the 
first to vehemently contend that the real interests of St. Petersburg and Vienna 
lay in expansion and not peace.63 The Observer, usually a more Liberal leaning 
publication, also approached the issue of Russian intervention with some 
circumspection, stating in one editorial that Russia sought to expand its interests 
in Eastern Europe by simultaneously demanding justice for the death of Consul 
Rostowsky, as well as seeking economic concessions from Istanbul.64 Russia’s 
intervention into the Macedonian crisis prompted British editors to ask who 
among the European Powers was the best agent to bring peace in Macedonia. 
While many within the Liberal press tended to assign Britain as the lead in this 
effort, being the most “disinterested” and “compassionate” of the Powers, it was 
agreed that the issue had to be dealt with collectively by Europe.65 The deaths of 
thousands of Christians posed a challenge to Europe as a “civilization,” thus its 
resolution was taken as a moral duty of “Christian” Europe.66 A repeat of the 
massacres in eastern Anatolia in 1890, “when the blood of Armenians ran like 
water and Europe stood idly by,” had to be avoided.67 
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Nonetheless, the most difficult question remained: What to do? While 
editors at the Daily News initially advocated giving Bulgaria “a free hand” at 
intervening in Macedonia and ending Ottoman rule in the Balkans, each of the 
newspapers surveyed agreed that the solution to the crisis was to create an 
autonomous province in Macedonia under nominal Ottoman control.68 This 
conclusion was not without precedence. In the light of previous civil conflicts in 
Crete and Lebanon, autonomy presented a successful model of handling the 
complexities of a post-Ilinden order.69 As a measure that both Europe and the 
Porte could find some common ground, the “Lebanon” solution would prevent 
the possibility of a war between either the newly independent Balkan states or 
the European Powers over the region.70 While sustaining Ottoman suzerainty in 
Macedonia was not entirely desirable, editors advocated the stationing of 
Western advisors along side specifically appointed Ottoman administrators in 
order to maintain law and order.71 Considering the tensions demonstrated by 
Exarchists and Patriarchists during the Ilinden Uprising, few among the British 
press trusted the Balkan Christians to police themselves.72 The plan received 
further backing from the Balkan Committee, a group composed of several well-
known “experts” in Macedonian affairs, including Henry Noel Brailsford and 
John MacDonald, special correspondent for the Guardian in the Balkans.73 
However, Brailsford would alter his views in a piece in the October issue of the 
Fortnightly Review, stating that the appointment of an Ottoman Christian 
governor by Europe, which was originally the demand of the VMRO, would 
only exacerbate tensions in Macedonia. Instead, the European Powers should be 
permitted to administer the province directly, allowing Istanbul only the right to 
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receive a small percentage of the tax revenues and to station a minimal number 
of troops on the “Albanian frontier.”74  
While violence may have situated Macedonia within the Balkans, it was 
within the political setting of the Near East that the management of Macedonia’s 
internal disorder was discussed. Within this particular discourse, the imperial 
vision of British observers determined Macedonia’s continued association with 
the remainder of the eastern Mediterranean and the Levant. Represented as yet 
another cancer threatening the integrity of the Ottoman state, Macedonia drew 
active comparisons with Lebanon, eastern Anatolia and Crete. The deaths of 
Exarchists during the Ilinden Uprising, like the massacres of Armenians in 
eastern Anatolia a decade earlier, aroused impassioned calls for the defence of 
Christianity by a united Europe. Not unlike many other instances of imperial 
intervention, the Liberal and Tory press entrusted European know-how to 
civilize and reform the Macedonian countryside. Yet in the interest of peace 
between the competing imperial powers in the eastern Mediterranean, the 
resolution to the violence in Macedonia had to be based upon internationally 
recognized precedents (in this case, Lebanon and Crete). In spite of their desire 
to see the Ottomans expelled from the Balkans, British journalists and editors 
perceived the fate of Macedonia as having a direct effect upon the stability of 
the entire Near East. Thus, the Sultan’s right to Macedonia, for the time being at 
least, had to be respected.  
 
CONCLUSION 
Since the disappearance of the Ottoman Empire, Macedonia has been slowly re-
integrated into the mental map of Europe. With the rise of the new geopolitical 
borders of the Cold War, Macedonia was detached from the post-Ottoman “Near 
East” (which was by and large reinvented as the modern Middle East) and 
became identified with Eastern Europe and the evolving Yugoslav state. The 
social and political upheaval that has confronted the former Yugoslavia has to 
some degree revived the image of Macedonia as the crossroads of East and West. 
In his 1993 bestseller Balkan Ghosts, Robert Kaplan characterizes post-Ottoman 
Macedonia as a “historical and geographic reactor furnace,” a place where the 
“tectonic plates of Africa, Asia and Europe collide and overlap.” 75  The 
politicization of Islam as a force within the Balkans, as well as the present “War 
on Terror,” has also had an effect upon the notion of Macedonia as contested 
ground. After the uprising of the National Liberation Army in the first half of 
2001, false rumours of an Islamist/Al-Qaeda conspiracy in Macedonia surfaced 
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in both the Western and Balkan media.76 Macedonia’s ambiguous relationship 
with the “Islamic world” is not unique in contemporary Europe. As in the case 
of Turkey’s application to the European Union, many figures in Western Europe 
have cast doubt on whether a Muslim, “non-Western” nation could ever 
integrate itself into the “Christian club” of European states. 
Contemporary skepticism over Turkey’s relationship to the European Union, 
like Macedonia during the turn of the century, reveals a much broader quandary 
over the criteria for one allegiance to a specific space. Does geography define a 
state’s association to an entity such as Europe? Or do “cultural” or “historical” 
affiliations play a greater role in mapping geographic borders? The creation of 
the mental map of Europe is a layered, evolving phenomenon. As seen through 
the coverage of the Ilinden Uprising, Macedonia at the turn of the century was 
concurrently within, and exclusive of, Europe. Comprising a segment of 
Europe’s geographic periphery, Macedonia was a Balkan land. While the 
violence of the Ilinden Uprising served to reinforce Macedonia’s “Balkan-ness,” 
the emergence of indigenous, “quasi-Oriental” actors (Muslim Albanians) 
suggested that Macedonia’s ties to the Muslim lands east of the Bosphorus were 
perhaps stronger than other areas of the Balkans. Yet culture and physical 
geography was not the only determinant of Macedonia’s spatial identity. The 
political borders of the region, as well as political prerogatives of the European 
powers, situated Macedonia outside of European internal affairs.   
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